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Abstract:  Yes. We construct a measure of aggregate technology change, controlling for imperfect 
competition, varying utilization of capital and labor, and aggregation effects.  On impact, when 
technology improves, input use falls sharply, and output may fall slightly.  With a lag of several years, 
inputs return to normal and output rises strongly.  We discuss what models could be consistent with this 
evidence.  For example, standard one-sector real-business-cycle models are not, since they generally 
predict that technology improvements are expansionary, with inputs and (especially) output rising 
immediately.  However, the evidence is consistent with simple sticky-price models, which predict the 
results we find: When technology improves, input use generally falls in the short run, and output itself 
may also fall.   
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members of its staff.   When technology improves, does employment of capital and labor rise in the short run?  Standard 
frictionless real-business-cycle models generally predict that it does.  By contrast, other macroeconomic 
models predict the opposite.  For example, sticky-price models generally predict that technology 
improvements cause employment to fall in the short run, when prices are fixed, but rise in the long run, when 
prices change.  Surprisingly, plausible sticky-price models also imply that technology improvements may 
reduce output as well as inputs in the short run.  Hence, correlations among technology shocks, inputs, and 
output shed light on the empirical merits of different business-cycle models. 
  Measuring these correlations requires an appropriate measure of aggregate technology.  We construct 
such a series by controlling for non-technological effects in the aggregate Solow residual:  increasing returns, 
imperfect competition, varying utilization of capital and labor, and aggregation effects.1  Our “corrected” 
technology residual varies about one-half as much as the Solow residual.  In addition, though the Solow 
residual is strongly procyclical, technology fluctuations tend to be countercyclical—contemporaneously, they 
have a significantly negative correlation with inputs, and a near-zero correlation with output. 
  We then explore the dynamic response of the economy to technology shocks.  Technology 
improvements reduce employment within the year, but increase employment with a lag of up to two years.  
Output falls slightly (though not by a statistically significant amount) in the first year, but increases strongly 
thereafter.  Output ultimately increases about as much as technology improves, roughly as one expects. 
  Correcting for unobserved input utilization is central for understanding the relationship between the 
procyclical Solow residual and our countercyclical technology residual.  Utilization is a form of primary 
input.  Our estimates imply that when technology improves, unobserved utilization as well as observed inputs 
fall sharply on impact.  Both then recover with a lag.  In other words, when technology improves utilization 
falls—so the Solow residual rises less than technology does.   
  Of course, if technology shocks were the only impulse—and if, as we estimate, these shocks were 
negatively correlated with the cycle—then after controlling for utilization, we would still be likely to observe 
a negative (though weakened) correlation between the observed Solow residual and the business cycle.  
Demand shocks can explain why, by contrast, the observed Solow residual is procyclical.  When demand 
increases, output and inputs—including unobserved utilization—increase as well.  We find that shocks other 
                                                       
1  For some of the many recent references on technology and the Solow residual, see, for example, Basu (1996), Basu 
and Fernald (1997a), Bils and Cho (1994), Burnside (1996), Burnside et al. (1996), and Shapiro (1996).   2
than technology are much more important at cyclical frequencies, so changes in utilization make the observed 
Solow residual procyclical. 
  We identify technology shocks using the tools of Basu and Fernald (1997a) and Basu and Kimball (1997), 
who in turn build on Solow (1957) and Hall (1990).  Basu and Fernald stress the role of sectoral heterogeneity.  
They argue that for economically plausible reasons—e.g., differences across industries in the degrees of market 
power—the marginal product of an input may differ across uses.  Growth in the aggregate Solow residual then 
depends on which sectors change input use the most over the business cycle.  Basu and Kimball stress the role of 
variable capital and labor utilization.  Their basic insight is that a cost-minimizing firm operates on all margins 
simultaneously—whether observed or unobserved—ensuring that the marginal benefit of any input equals its 
marginal cost.  As a result, increases in observed inputs can proxy for unobserved changes in utilization.  For 
example, when labor is particularly valuable, firms will work existing employees both longer (increasing 
observed hours per worker) and harder (increasing unobserved effort). 
  Together, these two papers imply that to construct an index of aggregate technology change, one should 
first “purify” sectoral Solow residuals and then aggregate across sectors.  Thus, our fundamental 
identification comes from estimating sectoral production functions, using instruments that we argue are 
uncorrelated with true technology change. 
   Galí (1999) and Kiley (1997) have independently used a quite different method to investigate similar 
issues.  Following Blanchard and Quah (1989) and Shapiro and Watson (1988), they identify technology 
shocks using long-run restrictions in a structural VAR.  In particular, Galí and Kiley make the identifying 
assumption that only technology shocks can affect labor productivity in the long run.  Galí examines 
aggregate data for a number of countries, while Kiley investigates sectoral data for U.S. manufacturing 
industries.  Like us, they find that technology shocks reduce input use. 
  Shea (1998) proposes yet another method, and also finds results consistent with ours.  He measures 
technology shocks as innovations to R&D spending and patent activity.  With a long lag, he finds that 
process innovations (as opposed to product innovations) raise measured productivity and reduce inputs.  As 
Galí (1998) notes, innovations generally should have their greatest effect when they increase productivity 
rather than when the original R&D or patent activity takes place.  (Of course, forward-looking variables like 
consumption or stock prices react when the outcome of the R&D investment is known, which may be before   3
measured productivity changes.)  Hence, Shea finds, as we do, that when technology rises, inputs fall.2 
  Our approach has two advantages relative to these papers.  First, our results do not depend on long-run 
identifying assumptions that may not hold.  For example, Galí’s and Kiley’s identifying assumption that only 
technology shocks change long-run labor productivity is not robust to increasing returns or permanent 
changes in the composition of output—two non-technology shocks that can change long-run labor 
productivity.3  Moreover, even if the long-run restriction holds, it produces well-identified shocks and 
reliable inferences only under strict conditions (see, for example, Faust and Leeper, 1997).  Our production-
function approach, by contrast, seeks to identify technology shocks directly.  Second, we construct a long 
time series of technology residuals.  Shea’s data do not allow him to construct a long time series, nor can he 
investigate results outside of manufacturing.   
  Nevertheless, the three approaches are best regarded as complements, with distinct identification 
schemes and strengths.  Despite differing data, countries, and methods, the bottom line is that the three very 
different approaches give similar results.4  It thus appears we have uncovered a robust stylized fact:  
technology improvements are contractionary on impact.   
  What implications do these results have for modeling business cycles?  They are clearly inconsistent 
with standard parameterizations of frictionless RBC models, including the recent attempt by King and Rebelo 
(1998) to “resuscitate” these models.  However, our findings are consistent with the predictions of dynamic 
general-equilibrium models with sticky prices.  Consider the simple case where the quantity theory governs 
the demand for money, so output is proportional to real balances.  In the short run, if the supply of money is 
fixed and prices cannot adjust, then real balances and hence output are also fixed.  Now suppose technology 
improves.  Firms now need less labor to produce this unchanged output, so they lay off workers and reduce 
hours.5  Over time, however, prices adjust, the underlying real-business-cycle dynamics take over, and output 
rises.  Relaxing the quantity-theory assumption allows for richer output dynamics:  as we discuss in Section 
V, output can actually fall after a technology improvement, matching the pattern we observe in U.S. data. 
  Of course, in a sticky-price model, the technology improvements will be contractionary only if the 
                                                       
2 Zachariadis (1999) finds that R&D and patent activity have a statistically significant relationship with our measure of 
technology change, with substantial lags.  The relationship is somewhat weaker with the standard Solow residual. 
3 Sarte (1997) argues that Galí’s results are sensitive to alternative “reasonable” long-run identifying assumptions. 
4  Jordi Galí tells us that for the United States, his measure of technology has a correlation of 0.6 with ours. 
5 Tobin (1955) makes essentially this argument, in a model with an exogenously fixed nominal wage.     4
monetary authority does not offset their short-run effects through expansionary monetary policy.  After all, 
standard sticky-price models predict that a technology improvement that increases full-employment output 
creates a short-run deflation, which in turn gives the monetary authority room to lower interest rates.  In 
Section V, we argue that technology improvements are still likely to be contractionary, reflecting the fact that 
central banks react with a lag as well as the fact that inflation may be sluggish, leading the central bank to 
keep interest rates close to pre-shock levels for a long time.  
  Clearly, our results are not a “test” of sticky-price models of business cycles, even though the results are 
consistent with that interpretation.  We favor this interpretation in part because sticky-price models are 
desirable on other grounds, notably, their ability to generate large monetary non-neutralities.  Nevertheless, 
other explanations are possible, including a flexible-price world with autocorrelated technology shocks; 
sectoral shifts, if reallocations are larger when mean technology is higher; the need to learn about new 
technologies, leading to unobserved investments in knowledge; and cleansing effects of recessions, in which 
recessions lead to reorganization within a firm or the elimination of low-productivity firms within an 
industry.6  We discuss these alternative explanations at length in Section V.  We conclude that the sticky-
price explanation seems the most consistent with the data.  
  The paper has the following structure.  Section I reviews our method for identifying sectoral and 
aggregate technology change.  Section II discusses data and econometric method.  Section III presents our 
main empirical results.  Section IV discusses robustness.  Section V presents alternative interpretations of our 
results, including our preferred sticky-price interpretation.  Section VI concludes. 
 
I. Estimating Aggregate Technology, Controlling for Utilization 
  This section describes our basic method of identifying aggregate technology.  The basic idea is to 
estimate Hall-style regression equations at a disaggregated level, with proxies for utilization.  We then define 
aggregate technology change as an appropriately-weighted sum of the resulting residuals.  Subsection A 
discusses the augmented Solow-Hall approach and method of aggregation, while Subsection B discusses the 
theory underlying our method of controlling for utilization.7 
                                                       
6 Yorokuglu (1999) argues that with indivisibilities in consumption, process innovations may reduce input use. 
7 Basu and Fernald (1999) provide detailed derivations and discussion of the equations in this section.   5
A. Firm and Aggregate Technology 
  We assume each firm has a production function for gross output:  
   Yi  Fi AiKi, EiHiNi,Mi,Zi  . (1.1) 
The firm produces gross output, Yi, using the capital stock Ki, employees Ni, and intermediate inputs of 
energy and materials Mi.  We assume that the capital stock and number of employees are quasi-fixed, so their 
levels cannot be changed costlessly.  However, firms may vary the intensity with which they use these quasi-
fixed inputs:  Hi is hours worked per employee; Ei is the effort of each worker; and Ai is the capital utilization 
rate (i.e., capital’s workweek). Total labor input, Li, is the product EiHiNi.  The firm's production function F
i 
is (locally) homogeneous of arbitrary degree i  in total inputs.  If i exceeds one, then the firm has increasing 
returns to scale, reflecting overhead costs, decreasing marginal cost, or both.  Zi indexes technology.  
  Following Hall (1990), we assume cost minimization and relate output growth to the growth rate of 
inputs.  The standard first-order conditions give us the necessary output elasticities, i.e., the weights on 
growth of each input.  Let dxi be observed input growth, and dui be unobserved growth in utilization.  (For 
any variable J, we define dj as its logarithmic growth rate ln(Jt / Jt1).)  The firm charges a markup i of 
price over marginal cost, where the markup equals one if the firm is perfectly competitive.  We find: 
   dyi  i(dxi dui) dzi , (1.2) 
where 
   dxi  sKidki sLi(dni dhi) sMidmi   ,   (1.3) 
   dui  sKidai  sLidei  , 
and sJi is the ratio of the cost of input J to total revenue.  Section I.B explores ways to measure dui. 
  How are the firm-level technology shocks dzi, defined (implicitly) by equation (1.2), related to 
aggregate technology shocks?  Aggregate technology change is sometimes defined from a macro (top down) 
perspective, and sometimes from a micro (bottom up) perspective.  A sensible macro definition is the change 
in final output (i.e., C I G X  M), for given aggregate primary inputs.  A sensible micro definition is an 
appropriately-weighted average of firm-level technology change.  With constant returns and perfect 
competition, the correct definition is unambiguous, since the macro perspective yields a unique measure that 
is equivalent to the natural micro measure (Domar, 1961; Hulten, 1978).  Rotemberg and Woodford (1995) 
show that equivalence also holds with imperfectly competitive product markets, but only under certain 
restrictive conditions: factor markets must be competitive, and all firms must have identical separable gross-  6
output production functions, charge prices that are the same markup over marginal cost, and always use 
intermediate inputs in fixed proportions to gross output. 
  If the Rotemberg-Woodford assumptions fail—if, for example, factor markets are imperfectly 
competitive or firms have different degrees of market power—then the two perspectives may lead to different 
definitions; indeed, neither the macro nor the micro perspectives yield a single unambiguous measure.  For 
example, suppose differences in markups or factor payments across firms lead the same factor to have a 
different social value for its marginal product in different uses.  Then changes in the distribution of inputs 
can affect final output, even if firm-level technology and aggregate inputs are held constant.  Conceptually, 
however, we may not want to count such variations as “technology change,” since they can occur with no 
change in the technology available to any firm.  
  Now consider the following definition:  Technical change is the increase in aggregate output, holding 
fixed not only aggregate primary inputs, but also their distribution across firms and the materials/output ratio 
at each firm.  Although this definition is close in spirit to the macro perspective, it also corresponds to a 
reasonable micro definition, since aggregate technology changes only if firm-level technology changes.  In 
particular, Basu and Fernald (1997b) show that this measure of technical change equals:  




where wi equals  P iYi  P MiMi   PiYi PMiMi   i   P i
VVi PVV , the firm's share of aggregate nominal value 
added.  Conceptually, this measure first converts the gross-output technology shocks to a value-added basis 
by dividing through by 1sM .  (A value-added basis is desirable because of the national accounts identity, 
which tells us that aggregate final expenditure equals aggregate value added.)  These value-added shocks are 
then weighted by the firm’s share of aggregate value added. 
  Equation (1.4) defines a “micro” measure of technical change, since it changes only if firm-level 
technology changes.  However, it nests the Rotemberg-Woodford definition as a special case, and thus 
correctly measures “macro” technical change under their conditions.  This property is desirable, since the 
Rotemberg-Woodford assumptions are implicit or explicit in most dynamic general-equilibrium models with 
imperfect competition.  We thus focus on definition (1.4) in constructing aggregate technology. 
  However, a disadvantage of the measure in equation (1.4) is that it requires the firm-level markups.  
Domar (1961) and Hulten (1978) propose a different definition of aggregate technology:   7




They show that equation (1.5) satisfies both the micro and macro definitions of technical change when there 
are constant returns and perfect competition; (1.4) then reduces to (1.5). 
  With imperfect competition, the Domar-weighted measure shows how much final output changes from 
changes in firm-level technology, holding fixed both the aggregate quantities and the distributions of primary 
and intermediate inputs.  We find this definition of aggregate technical change unappealing, since it 
corresponds to a thought experiment where firms cannot use more intermediate inputs even when they 
receive favorable technology shocks.  However, since this measure has the advantage of not requiring 
knowledge of sectoral markups, we use it to check the robustness of our primary measure. 
  We define changes in aggregate utilization as the contribution to final output of changes in firm-level 
utilization.  This, in turn, is a weighted average of firm-level utilization change dui, estimated using one of 
the methods in the next sub-section: 




Note from equation (1.2) that idui enters in a manner parallel to dzi and hence (1.6) parallels (1.4).   
 
B.  Measuring Firm-Level Capacity Utilization 
 Utilization  growth,  dui, is a weighted average of growth in capital utilization, Ai, and labor effort, Ei.  
The challenge in estimating firm and aggregate technology using equations (1.2) and (1.4) is to relate dui to 
observable variables.  We do so following Basu and Kimball (1997), who use the basic insight that a cost-
minimizing firm operates on all margins simultaneously, so the firm’s first-order conditions imply a 
relationship between observed and unobserved variables.  Thus, increases in observed inputs can, in 
principle, proxy for unobserved changes in utilization.   
  The model of this section provides theoretical microfoundations for a simple proxy.  In particular, 
changes in hours worked proxy appropriately for unobserved changes in both effort and capital utilization.  
We are thus able to control appropriately for variable utilization without (perhaps heroically) assuming that 
one can observe either the firm’s internal shadow prices of capital, labor and output; or the true quantities of 
capital and labor input at high frequencies.  Our results use only the cost-minimization problem and the   8
assumption that firms are price-takers in factor markets; we do not require any assumptions about the firm’s 
pricing and output behavior in the goods market. 
  Following Basu and Kimball (1997), we model the firm as facing adjustment costs in both investment and 
hiring, so that both the amount of capital (number of machines and buildings), K, and employment (number of 
workers), N, are quasi-fixed.  We believe that quasi-fixity is necessary for a meaningful model of variable factor 
utilization.  Higher utilization must be more costly to the firm, otherwise factors would always be fully utilized.  
If there were no cost to increasing the rate of investment or hiring, firms would always keep utilization at its 
minimum level and vary inputs using only the extensive margin, hiring and firing workers and capital costlessly.  
Only if it is costly to adjust along the extensive margin is it sensible to adjust along the intensive margin, and 
pay the costs of higher utilization.8 
  We assume that the number of hours per week for each worker, H, can vary freely, with no adjustment cost.  
In addition, both capital and labor have freely variable utilization rates.  For both capital and labor, the benefit of 
higher utilization is its multiplication of effective inputs.  We assume the major cost of increasing capital 
utilization, A, is that firms may have to pay a shift premium (a higher base wage) to compensate employees for 
working at night, or at other undesirable times.9  We take A to be a continuous variable for simplicity, although 
variations in the workday of capital (i.e., the number of shifts) are perhaps the most plausible reason for 
variations in utilization.  The variable-shifts model has had considerable empirical success in manufacturing 
data, where, for a short period of time, one can observe the number of shifts directly.10  The cost of higher labor 
utilization, E, is a higher disutility on the part of workers that must be compensated with a higher wage.  We 
allow for the possibility that high-frequency fluctuations in this wage might be unobserved, as could be the case 
if wage payments are governed by an implicit contract in a long-term relationship.  
  We consider the following dynamic problem, in which an industry’s representative firm minimizes the 
                                                       
8  One does not require internal adjustment costs to model variable factor utilization in an aggregative model (see, e.g., 
Burnside and Eichenbaum, 1996), since changes in the representative firm’s input demand affects the aggregate real wage 
and interest rate.  However, since we want to model the behavior of industries that vary utilization in response to 
idiosyncratic changes in technology or demand, we require internal adjustment costs in order to have a coherent model of 
variable factor utilization.  (Haavelmo’s (1960) treatment of investment makes both of these observations.) 
9 Basu and Kimball (1997) extend this model to allow utilization to affect the rate at which capital depreciates. 
10  See, e.g., Beaulieu and Mattey (1998) and Shapiro (1996).   9
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In each period, the firm’s costs in (1.7) are total payments for labor and materials, and the costs associated with 
undertaking gross investment I and hiring (net of separations) R..  WG H,E  VA   is total compensation per 
worker (which may take the form of an implicit contract, and hence not be observed period-by-period).  W is the 
base wage; the function G specifies how the hourly wage depends on effort, E, and the length of the workday, H; 
and V(A) is the shift premium. PM  is the price of materials. WN(R N) is the total cost of changing the number 
of employees; P IKJ I K   is the total cost of investment;  is the rate of depreciation.  We omit time subscripts 
where this practice does not cause confusion. 
  We assume that  and J are convex, and make the appropriate technical assumptions on G in the spirit of 
convexity and normality.11  We make some normalizations relative to normal or “steady-state” levels of the 
variables.12  Let J   ,   J    1,   0  0.  We also assume that the marginal employment adjustment cost 
is zero at a constant level of employment:    0   0.  
  There are six intra-temporal first-order conditions and two Euler equations, for the state variables K and N.  
To conserve space, we analyze only the optimization conditions that affect our derivation; Basu and Kimball 
(1997) discuss the full problem in detail.  Let  be the multiplier on constraint (1.8);  has the interpretation of 
marginal cost.  Numerical subscripts denote derivatives of the production function F with respect to its first, 
second and third arguments, and literal subscripts denote derivatives of the labor cost function G.  The 
                                                       
11  The conditions on G are easiest to state in terms of the function  defined by ln G(H,E) = (ln H, ln E).  Convex  
guarantees a global optimum; assuming  >  and  >  ensures that optimal H and E move together. 
12  If there is a trend, the model can be expressed in terms of detrended quantities from the beginning.   10
conditions that we require are those for optimization with respect to choices of A, H, and E.  These are: 
  A:  F1K  wNG(H,E)  V (A) (1.11) 
  H:  F2EN  wNGH(H, E)V(A) (1.12) 
  E:  F2HN  wNGE(H,E)V(A)  (1.13) 
  Note that the firm’s uncertainty about future variables does not affect our derivations, which rely only on 
(some of) the intra-temporal equations for optimization.  Uncertainty affects the evolution of the state variables 
(as the Euler equations would show) but not the minimization of variable cost at a point in time, conditional on 
the levels of the state variables.  Our utilization proxy depends only on this static variable-cost minimization. 
  Equations (1.12) and (1.13) can be combined into an equation implicitly relating E and H: 
  






The elasticity of labor costs with respect to H and E must be equal, because on the benefit side the elasticities of 
effective labor input with respect to H and E are equal.  Given the assumptions on G, (1.14) implies a unique, 
upward-sloping E-H expansion path, so that we can write 
   E  EH  ,  E H   0. (1.15) 
Equation (1.15) expresses unobserved intensity of labor utilization E as a function of the observed number of 
hours per worker H.  We define   H  E H   EH    as the elasticity of effort with respect to hours, 
evaluated at the steady state.  Log-linearizing, we can write the growth rate of effective labor input as: 
 
   d ln EHN  dn dhde  dn 1  dh. (1.16) 





















  The left-hand side is a ratio of output elasticities, which (as in Hall 1990) one can show are proportional 
to factor cost shares when cost is minimized.  We denote these cost shares by K and L.  Define g(H) as 
the elasticity of cost with respect to hours, and  () vAas the ratio of the marginal to the average shift 
premium:   11
   gH  
HGH H,EH  
GH ,EH  
 (1.18) 






 . (1.19) 
With these definitions, we can write equation (1.17) as: 




The labor cost elasticity with respect to hours given by the function gH   is positive and increasing by the 
assumptions we have made on GH ,E  .  The labor cost elasticity with respect to capital utilization, given by the 
function  () vA, is positive as long as there is a positive shift premium.  We assume that the shift premium 
increases rapidly enough with A to make the elasticity increasing in A.  We also assume that K L  is constant, 
which requires that F be a generalized Cobb-Douglas in K and L.13 
  Under this assumption, the log-linearization of (1.19)  is simply 
   da dh


 . (1.21) 
where is the elasticity of g with respect to H and   is the elasticity of v with respect to A.  indicates the rate 
at which the elasticity of labor costs with respect to hours increases.   indicates the rate at which the elasticity 
of labor costs with respect to capital utilization increases.    
  Thus, equations (1.21) and (1.15) say that the change in hours per worker should be a proxy for changes 
in both unobservable labor effort and the unmeasured workweek of capital.  The reason that hours per worker 
proxies for capital utilization as well as labor effort is that shift premia create a link between capital hours 
and labor compensation.  The shift premium is most worth paying when the marginal hourly cost of labor is 
high relative to its average cost, which is the time when hours per worker are also high. 
  Putting everything together, we have an estimating equation that controls for variable utilization: 
                                                       
13 Thus, we assume Y  Z AK 
 K EHN 
 L,M  , where  is a monotonically increasing function.  As Basu and 
Kimball (1997) note, estimating the general case where the ratio of the elasticities is a function of all four input quantities 
would demand too much of the data and the instruments.   12
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We will not need to identify all of the parameters in the coefficient multiplying dh, so we denote that 
composite coefficient by  .  This specification controls for both labor and capital utilization.14 
  So far we have discussed only model-based proxies, using cost-minimizing conditions derived under 
fairly general assumptions.  One strand of literature controls for variable utilization under more restrictive 
assumptions of fixed proportions between an observed and unobserved input.  For example, Burnside et al. 
(1995, 1996) revive the suggestion of Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) and Flux (1913) that electricity use is a 
natural proxy for total capital services.  As a check on our model-based proxies, we assume: 
   da dk  d electricity  . (1.23) 
This procedure ignores variations in labor utilization.  It is also more appropriate for heavy equipment than 
structures, and hence may be a good proxy for capital input only in manufacturing industries. 
 
II.  Data and Method 
A.  Data 
  We now construct a measure of “true” aggregate technology change, dz, and explore its properties.  As 
discussed in the previous section, we estimate technology change at a disaggregated level, and then 
aggregate.  Our aggregate is the private non-farm, non-mining U.S. economy.  
  Since the theory applies to firms, it would be preferable to use firm-level data.  Unfortunately, no firm-
level data sets span the economy.  In principle, we could focus on a subset of the economy, using the 
Longitudinal Research Database, say.  However, narrowing the focus requires sacrificing a macroeconomic 
perspective, as well as panel length and data quality.  By focusing on aggregates, our paper complements 
existing work that uses small subsets of the economy. 
  We use data compiled by Dale Jorgenson and Barbara Fraumeni on industry-level inputs and outputs. 
                                                       
14 Basu and Kimball (1997) generalize this model to allow depreciation to vary depending on capital utilization, as in a 
variety of papers.  This modification introduces two new terms into the estimating equation, but Basu and Kimball cannot 
reject the hypothesis that these terms are insignificant; in any case, including them leads to results that are virtually 
identical to those reported below.   13
The data comprise 29 industries (including 21 manufacturing industries at roughly the two-digit level) that 
cover the entire non-farm, non-mining private economy.  These sectoral accounts seek to provide accounts 
that are, to the extent possible, consistent with the economic theory of production.  Output is measured as 
gross output, and inputs are separated into capital, labor, energy, and materials.  (For a complete description 
of the dataset, see Jorgenson et al., 1987.)  Our data run from 1947 to 1989; in our empirical work, however, 
we restrict our sample to 1950 to 1989, since our money shock instrument is not available for previous years. 
  We compute capital’s share sK for each industry by constructing a series for required payments to 
capital.  We follow Hall and Jorgenson (1967) and Hall (1990), and estimate the user cost of capital R.  For 
any type of capital, the required payment is then RPKK , where P KK  is the current-dollar value of the stock 
of this type of capital.  In each sector, we use data on the current value of the 51 types of capital, plus land 
and inventories.  For each of these 53 assets, indexed by s, the user cost of capital Rs is 
r s   1 ITCs ds   1  .  r is the required rate of return on capital, and s is the depreciation rate for 
assets of type s.  ITCs is the asset-specific investment tax credit,  is the corporate tax rate, and ds is the 
asset-specific present value of depreciation allowances.  We follow Hall (1990) in assuming that the required 
return r equals the dividend yield on the S&P 500.  Jorgenson and Yun (1991) provide data on ITCs and ds 
for each type of capital good.  Given required payments to capital, computing sK is straightforward. 
  Our empirical work requires instruments uncorrelated with technology change.  We use two of the Hall-
Ramey instruments: the growth rate of the price of oil deflated by the GDP deflator and the growth rate of 
real government defense spending.  (We use the contemporaneous value and one lag of each instrument.)  We 
also use a version of the instrument used by Burnside (1996):  quarterly Federal Reserve “monetary shocks” 
from an identified VAR.  We sum the four quarterly policy shocks in year t-1 as instruments for year t.15 
 
B.  Estimating Technology Change 
  To estimate “firm-level” technology change, we take the residuals from industry regressions of (1.22). 
We expect that residuals may be correlated across industries, so there are efficiency gains from estimating 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
15 We drop the third Hall instrument, the political party of the President, because it has little relevance in any industry.  
Burnside (1996) argues that the oil price instrument is generally quite relevant, and defense spending explains a sizeable 
fraction of input changes in durable-goods.  The qualitative features of the results in Section III are robust to different 
combinations and lags of the instruments.  Section IV considers the small sample properties of instrumental variables.      14
these regressions as a system of equations.  One concern is that the utilization coefficients are often estimated 
rather imprecisely. To mitigate this problem, we combine industries into three groups on a priori grounds, 
and restrict the utilization parameters to be constant within these groups.  Thus, for each group we have 
   iii i i i dy c dx dh dz     . (2.1) 
This parsimonious equation allows us to control for both capital and labor utilization if the cost of higher 
capital utilization is a shift premium.  The markup i differs by industries within a group (Burnside (1996) 
emphasizes the importance of allowing this variation).  The groups are durables manufacturing (11 
industries); non-durables manufacturing (10); and all others, such as construction, services, and utilities (8).  
We also estimate this regression omitting the hours-per-worker term to obtain residuals that do not correct for 
utilization.  Industry technology change is then the sum of the industry-specific constant ci and residual dzi.  
To avoid the “transmission problem” of correlation between technology shocks and input use, we estimate 
each system using three-stage least squares, using the instruments noted in Section II.A. 
  We confirmed that results are robust to using industry-by-industry rather than group estimation.  We 
estimated the individual equations with both two-stage-least-squares and LIML (which Staiger and Stock 
(1997) argue is less subject to small-sample biases).  Parameters are more variable with individual than group 
estimation, particularly the LIML estimates, but the median estimates are in both cases similar to the median 
3SLS estimates.  Estimating individual equations substantially increases the variance of the estimated 
aggregate technology residuals, but the main correlation results below are not qualitatively affected.16 
 
III. Results 
A.  Basic Correlations 
  We quickly summarize the parameter estimates from our Hall-style industry regressions.  The main 
focus of this and the sections which follow are the aggregate effects of technology shocks, where aggregate 
technology is estimated as an appropriately weighted average of the industry regression residuals.  
                                                       
16 The higher variance reflects the convexity of (1.4) with respect to the markup .  Suppose markup estimates are 
unbiased, but we increase the variance of the estimate around the true value.  The convexity of (1.4) then makes dz more 
sensitive to fluctuations in dzi  (The most extreme case is where the estimate of sM is close to one, so that 
11 ()  sM  approaches infinity.)  This potential sensitivity to estimates of the markup is one reason we look at the 
Domar-weighted aggregate from equation (1.5); although it has less theoretical basis than (1.4), markup estimates do not 
affect it.  The Domar-weighted residuals turn out to have a correlation of 0.94 with the markup-corrected residuals.   15
  Table 1 shows the parameter estimates from equation (2.1).  For the 29 industries, the value-added- 
weighted average markup estimate is 0.92.  For durables, the average is 1.05; for non-durables, 0.87; for non-
manufacturing, 0.89.  (Omitting the hours-per-worker term, the average markup in durables rises to 1.10, but 
the overall average rises only to 0.93.)  The estimates for non-manufacturing are the least precisely estimated, 
and the most variable.  Fortunately, the contractionary effects of technology improvements presented below 
are driven primarily by manufacturing, so the variability of non-manufacturing does not seem to be a major 
problem.  Our results are also not driven by any single industry—omitting industries that look like “outliers,” 
for example, has relatively little effect on results.   
  The coefficient on hours-per-worker, in the bottom panel, is strongly statistically significant in durables 
manufacturing.  In non-durables, it has a t-statistic of 1.6, with a p-value of 0.11.  In non-manufacturing, it is 
completely insignificant.  The results below are virtually unaffected if we use the residuals from the 
regression omitting the hours-per-worker term outside of durables. 
  Table 2 reports summary statistics for four series.  The first is the standard Solow residual, calculated 
using aggregate data alone, with no adjustments for utilization or markups.  The other three measures are 
derived from sectoral regression residuals.  The second makes no corrections for utilization, and is 
aggregated using our theoretically preferred “markup-weighting” from equation (1.4).  The third, our 
“preferred” series, uses hours-per-worker to control for utilization, and again is aggregated using markup-
weighting (1.4).  The final series again corrects for utilization, but then uses Domar aggregation from 
equation (1.5). 
  Panel A shows results for the entire private non-mining economy.  The variance of our corrected series 
are substantially smaller than for the Solow residual: The variance of the hours-corrected markup-weighted 
residual is less than half that of the Solow residual, and the standard deviation (shown in the second column) 
is only about two-thirds as large.  We do estimate negative technical change in some periods—see the third 
column—but the lower variance of the technology series implies that the probability of negative residuals is 
much lower.  The Solow residual is negative in 9 years out of 40; by contrast, the markup-weighted hours-
corrected measure (3) is negative in 5 years and the Domar-weighted measure (4) is negative in 3 years.   
  Panel B gives results within manufacturing alone.  Data within manufacturing (especially for output) are 
often more reliable than data outside manufacturing.  In addition, some other papers (such as Burnside et al., 
1996) focus only on manufacturing, so these results provide a basis for comparison.  The results are 
qualitatively similar to those for the aggregate economy.   16
  Some simple plots summarize the comovement in our data.  Figure 1 plots business-cycle data for the 
private economy:  output (value-added) growth dv, primary input growth, dxV , and the Solow residual dp (all 
series are demeaned).  These series comove positively, quite strongly so in the case of dp and dv. 
  Figure 2 plots our preferred (markup-weighted hours-corrected) technology series against these three 
variables.  The top panel shows that technology fluctuates much less than the Solow residual, consistent with 
intuition that non-technological factors, such as variable input utilization, increase the volatility of the Solow 
residual.  In addition, some periods show a phase shift:  the Solow residual lags technology change by one to 
two years.  This phase shift reflects the utilization correction.  In our estimates, technology improvements are 
associated with low levels of utilization—reflected in low hours-per-worker, which in our model implies low 
unobserved effort—thereby reducing the Solow residual relative to the technology series.  Hours per worker 
generally increase strongly a year after a technology improvement, raising the Solow residual. 
  The middle panel plots aggregate value-added output growth (dv) against technology.  There is no clear 
contemporaneous comovement between the two series—although, again, the series appear to have a phase 
shift:  output comoves with technology, lagged one to two years.   
  Finally, the bottom panel plots the growth rate of primary inputs of capital and labor (dxV ) and the 
same technology series.  These two series clearly comove negatively over the entire sample period.     
  The comovements between technology and input and output are clearly inconsistent with those found in 
the usual RBC literature.  By contrast, in Section V, we suggest a sticky-price model that is consistent with 
Figure 2.  In that model, the contemporaneous correlation between technology shocks and inputs is negative; 
the contemporaneous correlation of output growth and technology shocks is ambiguous.  Correlations turn 
positive with a lag, thus explaining the apparent phase shift in the figures. 
  We now examine the relationship between technology and other aggregate variables more formally.   
Table 3 shows simple correlations.  We include growth of total hours worked (dh + dn).  Panel A shows 
results for the aggregate private economy, and panel B shows results for manufacturing alone. 
  The top row of either panel shows the usual business-cycle facts:  The Solow residual is significantly 
correlated with output, total inputs, and hours.   Hours correlate more strongly with productivity than do total 
inputs, reflecting the low correlation of changes in the capital stock with the business cycle.   
  The third and fourth rows of both panels contain the key results of the paper: the correlations between 
technology and business-cycle variables.   These correlations differ sharply from those predicted by the usual   17
RBC model (e.g., Cooley and Prescott, 1995).  For our preferred measure in row 3, the correlation of 
technology with output is about zero, and the correlations with inputs are strongly negative: -0.37 for total 
primary inputs, and -0.43 for hours alone.   Both correlations are statistically significantly negative at the 95 
percent level.  The correlation of the corrected series with the Solow residual is positive, at 0.42. 
  The non-utilization-corrected technology series (row 2) shows the same general tendencies, but to a 
lesser extent.  For example, though the correlation of this series with output is strongly positive at 0.46, it is 
statistically smaller (at the 90 percent level) than the correlation between the standard Solow residual and 
output.  Non-utilization-corrected technology is not significantly correlated with inputs. 
  Note that the correlations between all three technology measures and output are statistically smaller 
than the correlation between the Solow residual and output, at the 90 percent level or better.  The correlations 
between the two utilization-corrected technology measures and inputs are statistically smaller than the 
correlation between the Solow residual and inputs, at the 95 percent level.17 
  As the top and bottom panels of Table 3 suggest, the contractionary effect of technology on inputs is 
particularly strong in manufacturing.  Indeed, durables manufacturing to a large extent drives our results.  For 
example, using the utilization-corrected series within durables and the non-utilization-corrected series 
elsewhere leaves the correlation with inputs almost unchanged, -0.48 compared with –0.49.  Within 
manufacturing, the strong negative correlation reflects the adjustments for both utilization and markups.  
 
B.  Dynamic Responses to Technology Improvement 
  Impulse responses to innovations in our technology series provide a simple and convenient way to show 
dynamic correlations between technology innovations and our basic variables.  The aggregate variables we 
examine are output growth (dv), input growth (dxV ), total hours worked (dh + dn), and our constructed series 
for utilization change, dˆ  u , defined by equation (1.6).  We first estimate an AR(2) process for our estimated 
dz series in order to derive the innovations, : 
   dˆ  z  t 0 1dˆ  z  t1 2dˆ  z  t2 t . (3.1) 
For dz we use our utilization-corrected markup-weighted measure of technology change; results are virtually 
identical using the Domar-weighted series.  To derive the impulse response of any variable J to a technology 
                                                       
17 To calculate the t-statistic for the difference in correlations, we assume the two correlations are independent.   This is 
obviously not the case, since technology affects productivity.  Taking account of this positive covariance would   18
innovation, we compute dj  i i0  ˆ  ti .  In practice, to estimate  ˆ   t and the moving-average terms i, we 
estimate equation (3.1), along with a second equation in which we regress dj on its own lags and current and 
lagged values of dz.  The impulses responses are derived using the estimated system, which we estimate by 
SUR.  In all cases, we use a lag length of two periods (in our case, years).18 
  Note that our procedure amounts to assuming that the technology series is completely exogenous, which 
is stronger than the standard ordering assumption in a VAR.  Using that ordering assumption would amount 
to including lagged values of dj in equation (3.1).  Doing so affects our results only slightly.  A deeper 
question is whether the exogeneity assumption is warranted.  As a check, we perform Granger causality tests, 
using a number of plausible variables (e.g., dv, dxV , dh, etc.)  In all cases, we cannot reject the hypothesis 
that the technology series is exogenous. 
  Figure 3 shows the impulse responses to a technology improvement: the effects of a 1 percent (that is, 
0.01) technology improvement on the (log) levels of technology, output, inputs, manhours, and utilization.  
We also present 95 percent confidence intervals, using the RATS Monte Carlo procedure.19 
  The technology series is approximately an AR(1) in first differences.  After a one percent innovation, 
technology increases about another 0.4 percent the following year, then levels off. 
  Both output and inputs fall on impact:  the fall in inputs is strongly significant, regardless of the type of 
input considered (capital and labor inputs dxV , manhours, or utilization).  The output decline is not 
significant.  Output grows strongly after the shock:  two years out, the impulse response differs significantly 
from zero, with output rising about 1.8 percent.  The point estimate shows inputs growing more slowly.  dxV  
falls 0.8 percent on impact, and then recovers to its pre-shock level (normalized to zero) in three years.  (The 
95 percent confidence interval is fairly wide three years out, running from 1 percent to -1 percent.)   
  The results for utilization explain the phase-shift from Figure 2.  On impact, technology improvements 
reduce utilization.  The Solow residual depends (in part) on technology plus the change in utilization (see 
equation (1.2)); the technology improvement raises the Solow residual, but the fall in utilization reduces it.  
                                                                                                                                                                                   
strengthen our argument, since it means that we overstate the variance, and hence understate the t-statistics. 
18   We do not use cointegration techniques, because levels of output and inputs need not be cointegrated with 
technology.  For example, changes in demographic structure (e.g., the Baby Boom) or in immigration policy can cause 
permanent changes in the size of the labor force that are not related to technology. 
19  These confidence intervals treat dz as data, although dz is a generated variable.  They do correct for the generated-
regressor problem in  given this assumption about dz.  We discuss the generated regressor issue in Section V.   19
Hence, on impact the Solow residual rises less than the full increase in technology.  With a lag, utilization 
increases, which in turn raises the Solow residual relative to technology. 
 
IV.  Robustness checks 
  We now address robustness.  We study the properties of technology shocks at the sectoral level; present 
an alternate method of controlling for utilization (electricity use); consider classical measurement error; and 
consider the small sample properties of instrumental variables.  Our finding of a negative contemporaneous 
correlation between technology and inputs survives these considerations. 
 
A.  Within-Sector Results 
  We now examine results at a one- and two-digit sectoral level.  The sectoral results make it clear that 
our results are not simply a consequence of our aggregation method.  Table 6 present results for 9 
(approximately one-digit) industries, as well as average correlations for the 29 industries in our sample. We 
concentrate on gross-output results, since gross output gives a clearer picture of the pattern of production at 
the industry level.  (Value-added results are generally quite similar.)   
  Overall, the results are qualitatively similar to the aggregate results in Table 3.   The average industry 
correlation of inputs with the Solow residual (dp) is 0.17; the correlation with our fully-adjusted technology 
residual (dt) falls to about -0.10.  Our corrections also reduce correlations between output and technology by 
more than a factor of two: the average correlation falls from 0.57 to 0.25.  In regressions not shown, we 
regressed industry input growth on industry technology residuals; we used a system of seemingly unrelated 
regressions, with coefficients on current and lagged sectoral technology innovations constrained to be the 
same across industries.  Again, we find that sectoral shocks reduce inputs sharply on impact.  For 
manufacturing industries, the contemporary coefficient is -0.44, with a t-statistic of 20; for non-
manufacturing industries, the contemporary coefficient is -0.33, with a t-statistic of 11. 
  Quantitatively, the sectoral results are less dramatic than the aggregate results, but that is not surprising.  
After all, we expect average industry correlations to be smaller than the aggregate correlation, for the simple 
reason that idiosyncratic shocks increase sectoral standard deviations in the denominator.  The aggregate and 
sectoral results may differ for two other reasons as well.  First, the economic effects on a sector from a 
common, widespread technology improvement may differ substantially from the effects of sector-specific 
shock.  After all, the general equilibrium consequences of a common shock are much larger.  For example,   20
economy-wide technology improvements appear deflationary, which in turn tends to be contractionary.  At 
the same time, aggregate shocks have greater wealth effects. 
  Second, from a mechanical perspective, sectors are not weighted equally in the aggregate results:  
sectors with large cyclical fluctuations have disproportionate weight.  In particular, cyclical fluctuations are 
very large in construction and durable-goods manufacturing, industries where our corrections are extremely 
important.  For example, our corrections reduce the output and input correlations for manufacturing durables 
from 0.76 and 0.66 (both significantly positive) to -0.56 and -0.61 (both significantly negative).  This pattern 
makes sense.  As Stigler (1939) suggests, industries where demand shocks are frequent and large may build  
flexibility—including scope for varying factor utilization—into the production process.  Thus, our 
corrections matter disproportionately for the very industries that account for a disproportionate share of 
fluctuations in output and input use, and thus are more important in producing the aggregate results. 
  Kiley (1998) correlates our industry residuals within manufacturing with those he derives using Galí’s 
(1999) identification scheme.20  All but three of the 20 correlations are positive; seven of the positive 
correlations are significant at the five percent level. 
 
B.  Electricity Use as an Utilization Proxy 
  Electricity use is sometimes used as a proxy for capital utilization.  As noted in equation (1.12), we set 
du dk  d electricity   and assume that unobserved effort is constant, so de  0.  (Jorgenson and Griliches 
(1967) and Burnside et al. (1995) agree that electricity proxies only for capital utilization.)  Table 5 shows 
results at the aggregate and manufacturing levels.  The top panel uses regression residuals, as described in 
Section I; the bottom panel uses “corrected” sectoral Solow residuals, as in Burnside et al. (1996), which 
amounts to setting all sectoral markups to one.21  The electricity proxy reduces the input and output 
correlations less than our other corrections.  For example, technology’s correlation with output is generally 
around 0.4; in Table 3, it is close to zero or negative.  Only in manufacturing, with regression residuals, can 
we not reject the hypothesis of a zero correlation.  Nevertheless, the input correlations—the main focus of 
our paper—are always close to zero or negative, consistent with the results using our model-based proxies. 
  Although qualitatively similar, our results differ quantitatively from those of Burnside et al. (1996), 
                                                       
20  Kiley’s work is reported in his (1997) paper. 
21   Following Burnside et al., output is value added and inputs are a weighted average of capital and manhours.   21
who find that the electricity correction reduces technology’s correlation with output to 0.1 in manufacturing.  
Different output data appear to explain the difference in results.  Burnside et. al (1996) use monthly industrial 
production as their basic output measure, averaged to either quarterly or annual frequency.  These data have 
two shortcomings.  First, in about one-third of manufacturing industries, IP is calculated from electricity 
usage.  Thus, subtracting electricity use from this measure of “output” biases results towards finding no 
correlation between technology and output.  Second, since Burnside et. al do not have data on intermediate 
inputs, gross output data (such as IP) is only appropriate under strong separability assumptions, as they note. 
 On  a priori grounds, electricity use probably cannot, in general, proxy for utilization.  At best, it proxies 
only for capital utilization, and even there it is most appropriate only for heavy equipment.  Variations in 
utilization of heavy equipment probably occurs mostly in manufacturing, not in, say, Finance or Services—
two industries together producing twice the value added of manufacturing.  However, for the manufacturing 
sector alone, results based on electricity-corrected residuals agree fairly closely with ours. 
 
C.  Classical Measurement Error 
  In principle, input measurement error could impart a negative bias to the correlation between 
technology and inputs.  We explore this issue with a simple model, which suggests that measurement error 
cannot explain our results.  First, for plausible parameterizations of the importance of measurement error, the 
“true” correlation remains negative.  Second, the observed covariance between measured output and 
technology, which is zero or negative, bounds the covariance between true technology and true inputs, again 
suggesting a negative “true” correlation.   
  In our empirical work, we take the entire regression residual as “technology,” which implicitly assumes 
that our utilization proxies control fully for all variations in utilization.  If they do not, but merely provide 
unbiased estimates of utilization, then the residual includes non-technological “noise” that is completely 
analogous to classical measurement error.  Our model here abstracts from variations in utilization and does 
not explicitly consider aggregation across industries; neither changes the basic message . 
  Suppose the true economic model is given by 
   dy  dx dz, (4.1) 
where the starred variables are unobserved, true values.  Both output and inputs are measured with error: 
   dy  dy   (4.2)   22
   dx dx  , (4.3) 
where  and  are iid, mean-zero variables with variances 
2 and 
2, respectively.  Note that the estimated 







  Now suppose we estimate (4.1) by instrumental variables.  If the instruments are uncorrelated with the 
measurement error, then the estimate of  is consistent.  Hence, in the limit, the only source of error in our 
estimate of technology change is the measurement error in dy and dx: 
   dz  dz   . (4.4) 
Abstracting from estimation error in , equation (4.4) implies that     dz dz
22 2 2 2   * .  Using equation 
(4.4), the covariances of estimated technology change with output and input growth are: 
   cov dz,dy  cov dz*,dy*  
2 (4.5) 
   cov dz,dx   cov dz*,dx*   
2. (4.6) 
  In terms of our estimated correlations and regression results, measurement error hence biases up both 
the estimated covariance between output and technology, and the estimated standard deviation of technology.  
If the true correlation between output growth and technology change is positive, then the estimated 
correlation may be biased either towards or away from zero, but cannot turn negative.  However, suppose the 
true correlation between output growth and technology change is negative.  Then the estimated correlation is 
unambiguously biased up (towards zero).  Thus, our point estimates in Table 3 of a negative correlation 
between output growth and technology change (statistically significant for manufacturing) cannot be 
attributed to measurement error. 
  On the other hand, if the true correlation between input use and technology change is positive, then the 
estimated input correlation is biased down.  If the true input correlation is negative, the estimated correlation 
may be biased up or down.  To get a sense of the potential magnitude of the bias from input measurement 
error, we write (4.6) in terms of correlations rather than covariances.  Some algebra yields: 























By specifying a markup and a variance for  ,we can calibrate this equation to the observed correlations and 
variances.  A markup of 1, for example, and a standard deviation of measurement error  of ½ percent per   23
year (compared with observed dx of 1.7 percent per year) would imply a “true” correlation of –0.43, 
compared with the observed correlation of –0.49.  This parameterization is close to the maximum permissible 
standard deviation for  , or else the data would violate a boundedness condition that we now discuss.  That 
boundedness condition gives another indication that measurement error does not drive our results. 
  We are mostly interested in the signs of the correlations rather than their sizes.  We can use the upward-
biased output covariance to bound the input-covariance from above.  Equation (4.1) implies that 
   cov dz*,dy*   cov dz*,dx*  , (4.7) 
(since the variance of dz is positive and  1).  But we see from equation (4.5) that 
   cov dz,dy   cov dz*,dy*  . 
Since the estimated covariance of output and technology is either zero or negative, we conclude that the true 
covariance of technology and inputs must also be zero or smaller.  Thus, our surprising results about the 
effects of technology improvements survive considerations of measurement error. 
  Since we cannot observe measurement error directly, we cannot say how much it affects our results.  
However, since the bias works against our finding that technology improvements reduce output, it seems 
likely that technology improvements are in fact contractionary.  Furthermore, unlike the simple model used 
here, our technology change series takes a weighted average of technology shocks across sectors.  If 
measurement error is relatively independent across industries, averaging should attenuate any biases. 
 
D. Small Sample Properties of Instrumental Variables   
  We now present several informal tests that indicate that the small sample properties of instrumental 
variables are probably not having a major effect on our results.  For the results presented in Section III, the 
first-stage regression of industry inputs dx on the instruments typically has an F statistic of around 4—
statistically significant, but lower than one would like.  Staiger and Stock (1997), for example, find that in 
some cases, instrumental variables estimators have poor small sample properties when the first-stage F 
statistic is less than about 10.22   
                                                       
22 On a priori grounds, all of the variables have strong grounds for being included, and have some relevance for at least 
some industries.  The instruments we use have close to the best overall fit (measured by mean and median F statistic) of 
the a priori plausible combinations we considered (measures with better “overall” fit generally perform very poorly in a 
couple of industries).  Of course, Hall, Rudebusch and Wilcox (1996) argue that with weak instruments, one does not   24
  First, Staiger and Stock note that LIML has better small sample properties than TSLS.  As we noted in 
Section II, LIML gives results that are qualitatively similar, though more variable, than our preferred results.   
  Second, we pooled industries within groups in order to raise the significance level of the first stage 
regression.  To implement this, we stacked industries and then estimated equation (2.2) as a stacked 
regression.    This approach raises various econometric issues, including the following.  (i)  To deal with 
differences in means (fixed effects), we demeaned all variables before stacking them.  (ii) To address 
concerns about possible heteroskedasticity, we estimated equation (2.2) by OLS for each industry, and then 
divided all variables by the regression standard error.  (iii) Ideally, the first-stage coefficients would be the 
same across industries within a group—otherwise, the first-stage fit need not improve.  Indeed, in non-
manufacturing this appeared to be a major problem, since the signs of coefficients were not always the same; 
in some industries, for example, input growth and oil prices are positively correlated, while in most industries 
the correlation is negative.23  Given that our results appeared to be driven by manufacturing, we resolve this 
issue by limiting our groups to durables and non-durables.  For both durables and non-durables, the first-
stage regressions of input growth and hours-growth on the instruments have large F statistics of between 10 
and 14—corresponding to p-values of less than 1/10 of 1 percent.   
  After estimating the pooled regressions, we “unmake” the residuals into industry residuals, and 
aggregate as before.  The resulting technology series has a correlation of 0.8 with our “preferred” 
manufacturing series (row 3) of Tables 2 and 3.  The correlation between technology and output is about 
-0.27, considerably less negative than the results in Table 3, but nevertheless statistically significant at the 10 
percent level, and with relatively similar dynamics.  (It is not surprising that the correlation is less negative, 
given that we lose some of the “reallocation” effects that come from allowing for differences in markups.)  
  As a final specification  test, we simulated 100 draws of random, irrelevant instruments, in the spirit of 
Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995), to get a sense of the actual small sample distribution of IV.  From the 
literature, one expects a bias towards the OLS estimates, which yield a small positive correlation between the 
“technology residual” and inputs.  Indeed, for five simulated instruments, the median simulated correlation 
for the markup-weighted estimate is –0.02; for the Domar-weighted series, the median is 0.15.  Only 3 out of 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
necessarily want to choose the instruments that happen to fit best in sample; for example, if the “true” relevance of all the 
instruments is equal, the ones that by chance fit best in sample are in fact those with the largest small sample bias. 
23 Pooling in non-manufacturing gave a very low first-stage fit for the instruments, and unreasonable parameter values.  
If we “peek” at the first-stage industry regressions—a dubious practice—and pool into two groups for non-manufacturing   25
100 simulated correlations for the markup-weighted measure were as negative as our observed correlation;.  
The simulated correlations for the Domar-weighted measure was rarely negative, and only once was as 
negative as our observed correlation.  It thus appears highly unlikely that the negative correlation reflects 
small sample biases of weak instrumental variables. 
 
V.  Interpretations of the Results 
A.  The Standard RBC Model 
  Are the responses of inputs and output to a technology improvement consistent with the standard RBC 
model (e.g., Cooley and Prescott, 1995)?  The long-run impact is certainly consistent.  Consider the Cooley-
Prescott model with a capital share of 0.35.  If Hicks-neutral technology rises 1.4 percent (one standard 
deviation), then in the long run output rises about 2.2 percent (i.e., 1.4/(1 - 0.35)), inputs (including capital) 
rise about 0.8 percent, and manhours and utilization do not change.  The point estimate for the output 
response is close to the predicted value.  The point estimate for the input response is much lower, but the 
predicted value is well within the confidence interval.  The same is true for manhours and utilization. 
  Our short-run findings, however, are strikingly at odds with the RBC model, at least as calibrated by 
Cooley and Prescott.  In their model, when technology improves, output, investment, consumption, and labor 
hours all rise on impact.  By contrast, the data strongly indicate that technology improvements reduce labor 
input.  Nevertheless, alternative calibrations of the model could deliver this result.  Technology 
improvements raise real wages, which has both income and substitution effects.  If the income effect 
dominates, labor input will fall.  Of course, positively autocorrelated technology change would reinforce this 
fall, since then both income and substitution effects tend to push towards lower current labor supply: workers 
might take more leisure initially, and work harder in the future, when technology is even better.  Indeed, our 
technology process is positively autocorrelated.  But if the leisure story were correct, employment should 
increase sharply when technology reaches its maximum, but a year after impact inputs are still significantly 
lower than their pre-shock value.24 
  Nevertheless, output’s response most strongly contradicts basic RBC theory.  Our point estimates show 
that output falls, although the response is not significantly different from zero.  That technology 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
based on signs of the parameters, we get “better” results, which turn out to look similar to those reported below. 
24  We discuss the issue of autocorrelated technology improvements further in the next subsection.   26
improvements reduce output as well as inputs on impact contradicts standard flexible-price RBC models 
driven by permanent technology shocks, since one can show that if consumption and leisure are both normal 
goods, then an improvement in technology must increase output (see Kimball, 1999).   
  The data also contradict King and Rebelo’s (1998) attempt to “resuscitate” the RBC model.  They add 
variable utilization of capital to the basic RBC model, substantially improving the model’s ability to 
propagate shocks.  They use their calibrated model to back out an implied technology series from the Solow 
residual.  By construction, their procyclical technology series, however small, drives business cycles.  Our 
empirical work, by contrast, does not impose such a tightly specified model—and the data reject the King 
and Rebelo model.  Hence, their model does not provide a viable explanation of business cycles any more 
than the basic RBC model does.  Instead, the main lesson we take from their paper is the importance of 
utilization as a propagation mechanism, a lesson which applies to more realistic models as well. 
  Thus, the short-run effects of technology improvements contrast sharply with the predictions of 
standard RBC models.  However, are those models right in assuming that technology shocks are the dominant 
source of short-run volatility of output and inputs?  Table 4 reports variance decompositions from the 
impulse responses in Figure 3.  At the business-cycle frequency of three years, technology shocks account for 
about one-third of the variance of output, but only 10-20 percent of the variance of different input measures.  
The patterns are intuitively sensible: manhours and utilization respond much more to technology at high 
frequencies.  (Steady-state growth, of course, requires that long-run labor supply be independent of the level 
of technology.)  By contrast, technology accounts for only about 5 percent of the short-run variance of the 
Solow residual, but almost 60 percent with a lag of three years.  Again, this pattern accords with our priors:  
in the short run, changes in utilization and composition account for much of the volatility of measured 
productivity.  But in the long run, as we expect, the Solow residual reflects primarily changes in technology.  
Our findings thus lie between the positions of the RBC and New Keynesian schools.  Technology shocks are 
neither the main cause of cyclical fluctuations, nor negligible.  Future models should allow for technology 
shocks, while making sure that the impulse responses of a model match those that we and others find. 
 
B.  Price Stickiness 
  Technology improvements can easily be contractionary in a sticky-price model, in contrast to the one-
sector flexible-price RBC model.  Suppose the quantity theory governs the demand for money and that the 
supply of money is fixed.  If prices cannot change in the short run, then neither can real balances or output.    27
Now suppose technology improves.  Since the price level is sticky and demand depends on real balances, 
output does not change in the short run.  But firms need fewer workers to produce this unchanged output, so 
they lay off workers and reduce hours.  Over time, however, as prices fall, the underlying RBC dynamics take 
over.  Output rises, and the higher marginal product of capital stimulates capital accumulation.  Work hours 
eventually return to their steady state level. 
  If money demand depends on interest rates as well as output, then a technology improvement could 
even cause output to fall in the short run.  Output falls if the technology shock causes an excess demand for 
money at the original level of output.  For example, if the money supply is unchanged, a technology 
improvement reduces expected inflation, since the price level must fall over time.  At a given real interest 
rate, lower inflation raises money demand.  Output then must fall to restore money-market equilibrium.  In 
addition, because improved technology allows the same output to be produced with less capital and labor, it 
will tend to reduce investment demand in the short run, which also tends to cause output to fall. 
  These effects are present in virtually any dynamic general-equilibrium model with sticky prices, such as 
Kimball’s (1998) Neomonetarist model.  Basu (1998) calibrates a DGE model with staggered price setting, 
and reproduces quite accurately the impact effect of technology improvements that we find in the data. 
  Of course, the monetary authority is likely to follow a more realistic feedback rule than simply keeping 
the nominal money stock constant, as our discussion has assumed.  Would it accommodate technology 
improvements by loosening policy, thereby avoiding the initial contraction?  Basu (1998) allows the 
monetary authority to follow a Taylor rule, setting the nominal interest rate in response to lagged inflation 
and the lagged “output gap”—the deviation between current and full-employment output.  He still finds that 
on impact, output barely changes when technology improves, while inputs fall sharply.  Monetary policy is 
insufficiently loose under a Taylor rule in part because the Federal Reserve reacts only with a lag—that is, 
after the shock affects inflation or the measured output gap.25 
  We now explore additional evidence to see whether the contractionary effects of technology 
                                                       
25  In Basu’s model, the contraction is relatively short-lived, unlike the response we find in the data.  First, since the 
model predicts strong deflation, the monetary authority lowers interest rates relatively rapidly after the technology 
improvement.  In practice, however, inflation may not immediately jump down in response to a technological 
improvement (for reasons that beg further theoretical explanation), so that monetary policy probably would not ease 
immediately after the shock.  Sluggish inflation appears to be observed empirically (see Fuhrer and Moore, 1995; 
Roberts, 1998; and Galí and Gertler, 1998).   Second, Basu’s model does not incorporate many “real rigidities.”   But 
Kimball (1995) shows that one can obtain a “contract multiplier” of any desired size by adding real rigidities to the 
model, thus making price adjustment arbitrarily slow.   28
improvements might plausibly work through the sticky-price channel.  The contractionary effects of sticky 
prices work through deflation and investment-demand channels, so we first investigate the behavior of those 
variables.  We then study the response of real interest rates and consumption to a technology improvement. 
  When technology improves, prices should fall, unless the Fed fully accommodates the increased 
demand for liquidity.  This deflation, in turn, tends to be contractionary.  Testing this prediction requires that 
we specify a time-series process for inflation.  In the mid-1980s, some commentators argued that the price 
level is I(2), implying inflation is I(1).  By the late 1990s, however, the 1970s look like an aberration—a time 
when policy responded differently to external shocks.  Thus, we model inflation as a stationary process, with 
a mean shift in the 1970s.26  We measure the price level with the GDP deflator. 
  The top right panel of Figure 4 shows response of prices to a technology improvement.  (We estimate 
impulse responses as described in Section IIIB).  The price level jumps down on impact, and continues to fall 
for three years before stabilizing significantly below its initial level.  The short-run behavior of prices 
accords with a model where the Fed does not fully accommodate all shocks.  (In fact, the long-run fall in the 
price level is almost the same as the long-run increase of output, as predicted if the nominal interest rate 
returns to its pre-shock value and the Fed does not increase the money supply.) 
  The middle left panel of Figure 4 shows the response of the real interest rate.  We measure the real rate 
as the annual average of the beginning-of-quarter 3-month Treasury bill rate, minus the actual rate of 
inflation for that quarter.  Kimball (1998) shows that in a simple sticky-price model without investment 
adjustment costs, we should expect r to fall initially (due to the fall in investment demand, which reflects that 
there is excess capital as well as excess labor), then rise as output rises—probably to above its steady-state 
level—before falling back to that long run level. 
  The interest rate does tend to fall initially and then rise along with output.  When technology improves 
one percentage point, the real interest rate declines about 0.35 percentage points.  The decline is not 
significant at the 95 percent level, although it is close to significant a year after the shock. 
  The middle right panel shows the response of consumption.  The point estimate shows consumption 
basically unchanged on impact, before rising strongly in subsequent years.  The increase is significant several 
years following the shock. 
                                                       
26  Results are almost unchanged if we allow a separate mean for all three decades.   If we constrain inflation to have a 
single mean over the period, the estimated short-run behavior of prices also does not change substantially.   29
  This consumption profile can help us distinguish between sticky-price models and flexible-price RBC 
models with autocorrelated technical change.  If one accepts that on impact there is essentially no effect on 
consumption, that provides further evidence against flexible-price RBC models, even with an arbitrary time-
series process for technology.  If consumption and leisure are normal, the fall in labor input with unchanged 
consumption implies that the real wage must fall.  But real wages and labor input can both fall only if labor 
demand shifts back.  In a competitive flexible-price model, labor demand depends only on the current level of 
technology (and the capital stock).  Thus, for labor demand to fall, technology must be labor-augmenting (so 
more technology is like more labor) and the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor must be low.  
For example, with a Leontief production function an improvement in labor-augmenting technology must lead 
to a short-run fall in labor demand.  But the required elasticity of substitution is too low to be credible.27  In 
any event, we suspect most RBC theorists would not accept parameterizations implying that technology 
improvements reduce labor demand. 
 
C.  Sectoral Shifts? 
  Price stickiness can explain why technology improvements are contractionary.  Alternatively, even with 
flexible prices, technology improvements might temporarily reduce output and inputs because of the costs of 
reallocating resources.  The short-run dynamics of this sectoral-shifts explanation depend on the unevenness 
of technology change across sectors, since inputs may need to shift between sectors in order to find their 
most profitable use.  If this reallocation is costly—as Ramey and Shapiro (1998) document for capital—then 
technical progress can, in the short run, reduce employment and GDP.28  In this section, we show that the 
evidence does not support this alternative hypothesis. 
  The sectoral shifts hypothesis implies that the larger the dispersion of technology shocks, the greater the 
pressure to reallocate factors to different uses.  Thus, an intuitive test of whether sectoral shifts drive our 
results is to add measures of the dispersion of technology change to our basic regressions, and see which set 
of variables has greater explanatory power.  A natural dispersion measure, Disp, is the cross-sectional 
                                                       
27 With constant returns to scale, labor demand falls only if the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is less 
than the output elasticity of capital.  Current evidence points to approximately constant returns to scale, so this condition 
requires an elasticity of substitution of no more than, say, 0.40.  Such a small elasticity of substitution contradicts most of 
the empirical evidence (see, e.g., Pindyck and Rotemberg, 1983). 
28  Lilien (1982) measures reallocative shocks as the cross-industry variance of employment growth, and argues for the 
importance of sectoral shifts.  Abraham and Katz (1986) criticize Lilien’s measures.  Loungani et al. (1990) and Brainard   30
standard deviation in technical progress: 















where i indexes industries,  is the technology impulse as defined in equation (3.2), and wi is the sector’s 
weight in aggregate value added.  Suppose that when technology improves, (measured) input and output fall 
because of costly factor mobility.  It seems reasonable that the greater the dispersion of technology shocks 
the greater the pressure for reallocation.  Thus, we test whether sectoral shifts drive our results by testing 
whether Disp is significant in explaining input and output growth.29 
  It seems unlikely that our technology impulse proxies for effects that are actually due to dispersion, 
since the correlation between the two variables is quite low.  To check this intuition more formally, we run 
regressions similar to those underlying the impulse-response functions in Figure 3.  In particular, in Table 7 
we regress output growth and various measures of input growth (dxV , manhours, and utilization) on 
estimated technology impulses (estimated as residuals from an AR(2) regression of our main technology 
series from Section III) along with current and two lagged values of Disp. 
  These regressions present econometric issues that also come up with the earlier impulse responses—we 
generate the regressor  ˆ   t  from dz, which is itself a generated series.  If our regression model (2.2) is correctly 
specified, the results below are consistent.  (Intuitively, generated regressors are like classical measurement 
error, with the variance of that error tending asymptotically to zero.)  However, measurement error in  ˆ   t  does 
affect coefficient standard errors, even asymptotically.  We do not account for this bias, so the standard errors 
are not correct.30  However, these errors are appropriate for testing the joint hypothesis that all the 
coefficients are zero—if the true coefficient on  ˆ   t  is zero, the usual OLS standard errors are correct.  In all 
cases we report, we reject this joint hypothesis at the 5 percent level.  
  In all cases in Table 7, adding Disp has little effect on the coefficients and standard errors of  and its 
lags.  The timing patterns discussed in Section IIIB are unaltered.  Most importantly, the addition of the Disp 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
and Cutler (1993) respond to this critique by using the cross-industry dispersion of stock market returns. 
29  This method does not rigorously test the sectoral shifts alternative, since a common aggregate shock affects optimal 
input use equally in all sectors only if all production and demand functions are homothetic.  Nevertheless, even if the 
dispersion index does not capture all forces leading to input reallocation it should capture some of them.  Thus, if sectoral 
shifts are important, our index dispersion index should significantly predict input and output growth. 
30  Correcting the standard errors in this problem is not straightforward, because the underlying data come from 29   31
variables leads to only a moderate improvement in the R
2 of the regressions—the increase is between 0.06 
and 0.10.  Thus, it is unsurprising that we can reject joint significance of Disp in all three regressions at 
conventional significance levels.  Overall, the evidence seems more consistent with the sticky-price model of 
contractionary technology improvement than with the sectoral-shifts alternative. 
  
D.  Time-to-Learn? 
  Several authors have argued recently that technological improvements may reduce growth for a time, as 
the economy adjusts to new methods of production.31  For example, Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997) argue 
that the introduction of computers caused the post-1974 slowdown in economic growth, since workers and 
firms had to accumulate new human capital in order to use the new technology effectively.   That is, when 
new technology is introduced, unobserved investment is high; but since the national accounts do not include 
investments in human capital as output, market output—and hence measured productivity growth—may be 
relatively low.  Therefore, low productivity growth is associated with high input growth, because “full” 
output is mismeasured.  Over time, the investment in knowledge does lead to an increase in measured output 
and productivity. 
  This class of models does not generally predict the results we find.  Our approach does not correct for 
the mismeasurement of output caused by unobserved investments in knowledge, so that when technology is 
introduced, we would conclude (incorrectly) that technology fell.  Since measured (as well as unmeasured) 
inputs are likely to rise at those times, we might find that technology contractions coincide with expansions 
in inputs.  However, with a lag, when market output rises, we would measure a technology improvement—
coinciding with a boom.  Hence, measured technology improvements would appear expansionary, not 
contractionary.  Therefore, if “learning-time” models are important, it should bias our results against finding 
a negative correlation between technology and output and inputs.  In addition, Figure 2 suggests that the 
negative correlation between measured technology and outputs reflects technology improvements as well as 
declines (relative to trend), so the learning-time story is unlikely to explain our results.   
                                                                                                                                                                                   
individual industries.  Hence, “standard” corrections (e.g., Pagan 1984) cannot be applied directly. 
31  See, e.g., Galor and Tsiddon (1997), Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1996), and Greenwood and Jovanovic (1998).   32
E.  “The Cleansing Effect of Recessions?” 
  Could causality run from recessions to technical improvement, rather than the reverse?   For example, if 
recessions drive inefficient firms out of business, then overall productivity might rise.32  A difficulty with 
this hypothesis has been its prediction of countercyclical productivity, while observed productivity is 
procyclical.  One response to this objection is that “other factors (labor hoarding, externalities, etc.) ... make 
measured productivity procyclical.” (Caballero and Hammour, 1994, p.1365).  One interpretation of our 
results is that we have succeeded in controlling for the “other factors,” and therefore are finding that 
technology is countercyclical as the cleansing models predict. 
  There is a subtle but important point here:  With firm-level data, endogenous cleansing would not be a 
concern.  In Basu and Fernald’s (1997b) terminology, this effect is a “reallocation”—a shift in resources 
from inefficient to efficient firms—not a change in firm-level technology.  Our theory excludes such effects, 
since we add up changes in firm-level technology to derive aggregate technology dz.  But since in practice we 
use industry data, our estimates of sectoral technical change could include intra-sectoral reallocation effects, 
which cleansing models predict are countercyclical. 
  Even if cyclical reallocations such as cleansing are important, these effects might not affect the 
cyclicality of our residuals.  In particular, to the extent that these kinds of intraindustry reallocations are 
important, they may be captured in our estimates of industry markups.  For example, suppose that for an 
industry, dy  dx R dz , where R reflects intra-industry reallocations of various sorts.  Also suppose these 
reallocations depend, in part, on input growth dx: R dx  . A cleansing effect of recessions implies  <0; 
 captures any reallocation effects that are uncorrelated with input growth.  Even if our instruments are 
uncorrelated with technology, they may be correlated with reallocations.  Suppose  is uncorrelated with 
either the instruments, or any cyclical variables.  Then although our estimates of the markup are biased, with 
a plim of ( +), the estimated technology shocks would not suffer from reverse causation.   is then a form 
of classical measurement error in output, discussed in Section IV.  (This cleansing effect could explain why 
some of our estimated industry markups are less than one.)   
 However,  if    is correlated with business-cycle variables—reallocations may, for example, depend on 
the aggregate cycle as well as sectoral inputs—then some part of our residuals may remain correlated with 
                                                       
32  This idea goes back at least to Schumpeter.  Foster, Krizan, and Haltiwanger (1998) provide empirical evidence on   33
output and input changes for reasons of reverse causality. 
  The cleansing explanation challenges our basic identifying assumption that industry technical change is 
exogenous.  If we expect at least some of the cleansing effect to work with a lag of more than one year, then 
Granger causality tests provide some evidence that our results are not being driven by reverse causality.  If 
cleansing is responsible for our results, and some of it operates with a lag of more than a year, we should find 
that lagged output or input growth significantly predicts our measure of technology change.  (It is sensible to 
expect some lagged effects, since entry and exit of firms is a relatively slow phenomenon.)  But we do not 
find that lagged output or input growth significantly predicts our measures of technology, providing some 
evidence against the cleansing interpretation. 
  As we noted above, the cleanest way to distinguish between these hypotheses is to use firm-level data.  
Most cleansing models take firm-level technical change as exogenous; it is the distribution of inputs across 
firms with different efficiencies that responds to aggregate demand.  Thus, technical change computed using 
firm-level data are not subject to the cleansing interpretation, and could provide an unambiguous test of our 
hypothesis.  On the other hand, as we note in Section II, there are no firm-level data sets spanning the 
economy, so a paper using firm-level data could not deal with the aggregate macro issues considered here. 
  Kiley (1998) points out a second variant of cleansing models, which might be termed models of 
“recessions as reorganizations”—a term coined by Hall (1991).  In these models, firms use times of low 
demand and output to reorganize production.  The reorganization raises productivity at each firm, so even 
firm-level data do not provide a dispositive test of our hypothesis versus the cleansing alternative.  But this 
variant of cleansing models predicts that when technology improves, investment is also high.  The investment 
may take the form of job search, as in Hall (1991).  But we should also observe higher capital investment, as 
Cooper and Haltiwanger (1996) document for the seasonal cycle in the auto industry. 
  In a sticky price model, it is easily possible for investment to go down.  Indeed, in Kimball (1998), it is 
declines in investment that cause output to go down in response to a technology shock.  This is not 
surprising, given the relationship of these effects with the behavior of the real interest rate.  In a richer sticky-
price setting, the behavior or investment is more ambiguous.  The short-run ambiguity comes from the fact 
that firms want less capital now, but know that they will want more in the future.  If there are large, convex 
investment adjustment costs, firms may decide to invest when technology improves in order to spread a given 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
the role of entry and exit in aggregate productivity growth.   34
volume of investment over a longer period of time.  On the other hand, the prices of investment goods will 
typically be expected to fall as firms reduce prices after the technology improvement—as we showed above, 
technology improvements are followed by predictable deflations—so firms may choose to wait and buy 
capital later at a lower price. 
  Thus, the behavior of investment provides a one-sided test: If investment falls, then the “reorganization” 
model probably cannot explain our findings.33  The bottom panels of Figure 4 show the responses of 
investment and the investment deflator.  Investment falls almost four percent in the year that technology 
improves, significant at the 95 percent level.  Investment then recovers strongly, peaking two years after the 
shock (the peak effect is significant at the 90 percent level).  Hence, since investment falls sharply, a flexible-
price reorganization model probably cannot explain the results we find.  On the other hand, the behavior of 
the investment deflator is consistent with the predictions of the sticky-price model.  Investment goods prices 
fall about three percent in response to the technology improvement (more than the drop in the overall price 
level, so the relative price also falls), but the majority of the decline occurs one to two years after the shock.  
Thus, it is sensible that firms reduce investment after the shock and increase it significantly two years later, 
when most of the decline in the investment goods price has already taken place. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
  In this paper, we measure aggregate technology by correcting the aggregate Solow residual for 
increasing returns, imperfect competition, varying utilization of capital and labor, and aggregation effects.  
We come to a robust conclusion: in the short run, technology improvements significantly reduce input use 
while appearing to reduce output slightly as well.  Inputs do not recover significantly until about two years 
after a technology improvement. 
  These results are inconsistent with standard parameterizations of real-business-cycle models, which 
imply that technology improvements raise input use at all horizons.  We also find that technology shocks do 
not account for a very high fraction of the variance of inputs and output at cyclical frequencies.  By contrast, 
we argue that these results are qualitatively consistent with the predictions of an otherwise-standard dynamic 
general-equilibrium model with sticky output prices driven by both technology and monetary shocks. 
  Note that our empirical work actually estimates a composite of the partial effect of a technology   35
improvement and the reactions of policy (especially monetary policy) to that technology shock.  If the Fed 
tries to stabilize inflation, then the size of the effect we estimate should then be regarded as the lower bound 
on the true partial effect.  This point may be especially relevant for estimating the dynamic effects of 
technology shocks—if the Fed “leans against the wind” and if some part of Fed policy operates with a lag of 
more than one year, it may appear that the economy recovers more quickly from a technology improvement 
than would actually be the case without Fed intervention. 
  We believe that our paper and the identified-VAR literature have identified an important stylized fact: 
Technical progress is contractionary in the short run, but has its expected expansionary effect in the long run.  
We advance price stickiness as the major reason for the perverse short-run effect of technical improvement, 
as does Galí (1999).  The evidence is broadly consistent with this view.  Nevertheless, it remains possible 
that other models could be consistent with the evidence as well.  Two of the main competing explanations are 
sectoral-shifts models and “cleansing effects” models.  We have presented some evidence that neither is 
responsible for our findings, but additional, sharper tests are needed before we can be sure that price 
stickiness is in fact responsible for our results.  (A difficulty, of course, is that the alternative hypotheses are 
not mutually exclusive, but could all contain an element of the truth.)  Additional research with firm-level 
data would be particularly useful. 
  Nevertheless, if one accepts the view that technology shocks interact with sticky prices, then our results 
have important implications for monetary policy.  First, monetary policy in the United States over the 1950 to 
1989 period did not respond sufficiently to technology shocks to allow actual output to adjust quickly to the 
new level of full employment output.  In this light, the debate in the last few years about whether technology 
has accelerated—and if so, how monetary policy should react—seems very much on target.  Short-run 
movements in technology growth matter just as much for the proper conduct of monetary policy as the long-
run rate of technology growth—if not more, since the main concern of monetary policy is short-run 
stabilization of the economy around the moving target of full employment output. To the extent that looking 
at a broader information set can give earlier warning about technological movements, monetary policy can be 
improved in the future. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
33  We thank Christopher Foote and Matthew Shapiro for this observation.   36
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Table 1. Parameter Estimates 
A.  Markup Estimates 
Durables 
Manufacturing 
   Non-Durables 
Manufacturing 
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0.87 
    
0.89 














Notes:  Coefficients from regression of output growth on input growth and hours-per-worker growth.   
Estimated by 3SLS for groups (durables, non-durables, and non-manufacturing), with hours-per-worker 
coefficient constrained to be the same within the group.   Instruments are the growth rate of the price of oil 
deflated by the GDP deflator and the growth rate of real government defense spending (contemporaneous 
value and one lag), and a monetary shock variable (see text).       41
 
  Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics for Technology Residuals 
(Percent per year) 
 
    A.  Private Economy 
 















(2) Tech. Residual  










(3) Tech. Residual 
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(3) Tech. Residual 






















Note:  Sample period is 1950-1989.   Technology residuals (2), (3), and (4) come from aggregating 29 industry residuals 
from regressing output on inputs.  (2) does not include any controls for unobserved utilization.  (3) and (4) include 
growth in hours per worker to control for unobserved utilization.  As described in the text, “markup weighting” weights 
industry residuals by ws ii M i /( ) 1  .  Domar weighting weights residuals by ws iM i /( ) 1 .   42
Table 3.  Correlations of Technology Residuals with Basic Data 
 
A.  Private Economy 
 






























(2) Tech. Residual  
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(2) Tech. Residual  












(3) Tech. Residual 
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Significance levels:  * 10 percent. ** 5 percent.  *** 1 percent.  (Calculated using Fisher transformation). Notes:  See 
notes to Table 1.  Sample period is 1950-1989.    43
    Table 4.  Fraction of Variance Due to Technology Shocks 
 
  
Lags Output  Inputs  Manhours  Utilization  Solow  Res. 
0  5  32 36 20  5 
1  10 24 29 13 38 
3  31 15 21 10 59 
10  41 6 14 6 66 
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Significance levels:  * 10 percent. ** 5 percent.  *** 1 percent.  (Calculated using Fisher transformation). 
Sample period is 1950-1989.   45

















0.38* 0.09 -0.16  -0.44* 
Manufact. Durables 
 
0.76* 0.66* -0.56*  -0.61* 
Manufact. Non-Durables 
 
0.55* 0.14 0.58* 0.22 
Transport 
 
0.68* 0.15 -0.08  -0.57* 
Communications 
 
0.57* -0.18  0.00 -0.66* 
Public Utilities 
 
0.57* -0.03 0.62* 0.19 
Trade 
 
0.79* 0.09 0.82* 0.17 
FIRE 
 




0.82* 0.53* 0.56*  0.19 
(Unweighted) Average of  
One-Digit Correlations 




    
Average of 29 Industries  
(21 Manufact, 8 other) 
 





Note: The 29 individual industries and the 9 one-digit industries span the private non-farm, non-mining 
business economy.  Except where noted, all averages are output weighted.  Technology dz is calculated as the 
residual from an industry-by-industry gross-output regression as described in Section II, with the full set of 
corrections for variable utilization.  All correlations are calculated from 1950-1989.  For one-digit 
correlations, a * indicates statistical significance at the 95 percent level.   46
Table 7.  Effect of Technology Improvements on Growth Rates of Output, Input, and Utilization 
 
    
  































































































































































































Note:  Technology innovations  t are residuals from a regression of technology growth (utilization corrected, markup 
weighted) on a constant and two lags.   Regressions in the table include a constant.  Sample period is 1954-1989.   47
















































































Note:  All series are demeaned.  Sample period in 1950-89.  All series cover the non-farm, non-mining 
private business economy.  Growth in aggregate output is measured as real value added.  Growth in inputs is 
measured as the  weighted average of growth in primary inputs of capital and labor.  The Solow residual is 
measured as output growth minus input growth.     48




Note:  The technology series is the markup-weighted hours-corrected residual.  For description of series, see 



















































































































































































































Solow Residual  49













































































































































































Note:  Impulse responses to a 1 percent (0.01) improvement in technology.  Technology is the markup-
weighted hours-corrected residual.  All entries are percent changes.  Dotted lines show 95 percent confidence 
intervals, computed using Monte Carlo bootstrap method.  Sample period is 1952-89.   50

















































































































































































Note:  Impulse responses to a 1 percent (0.01) improvement in technology.  Technology is the markup-
weighted hours-corrected residual.  All units are percent changes, except for the real interest rate, which is in 
levels.  Dotted lines show 95 percent confidence intervals, computed using Monte Carlo bootstrap method.  
Sample period is 1952-89 